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1 Introduction
Why are similar workers paid dierently? In his 2003 book of this title, Dale Mortensen
takes stock of a few decades of investigation of this question, that he had jumpstarted and
then developed. His answer is simple: imperfect competition in labor markets. Information
and other frictions, which make the outcome of job search time-consuming and random,
endows rms with monopsony power that they exploit, in the spirit of Coase (1972), by
committing to wage oers. This force depresses all wages towards the opportunity cost of
work. But workers cannot commit to their current wage oer, and, while employed, search
for better outside oers. In this environment, rms choose a wage policy that balances unit
labor costs with hiring and retention. As a result, in equilibrium wages must dier among
identical rms and workers. In the presence of heterogeneity in productivity and in demand
conditions among workers and rms, equilibrium wages still fall short of marginal products,
and contain a non-fundamental component of \frictional" inequality.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998, thereafter BM) formalized this powerful insight. Their
working paper, rst circulated in the 1980s, spurred the vast theoretical and empirical liter-
ature culminating in Dale Mortensen's 2003 book. The BM \wage posting" model quickly
emerged as the canonical framework for the analysis of wage inequality, labor turnover, and
unemployment. Each of the three exists in conjunction with the other two. Naturally, the
scope of this line of research eventually transcended wage inequality alone.
In a series of articles (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, thereafter
MPV09-MPV14, resp.) we explored both theoretically and empirically the business cycle
implications of the wage posting paradigm. Progress in this direction had been stunted by
technical diculties in nding equilibrium in an economy where the law of one price fails.
The other canonical model of the labor market now known as \DMP" (Diamond, 1982;
Pissarides, 1985; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) bypassed this hurdle by assuming that
trading partners bargain over their match surplus, hence wages are not allocative. This
search-and-matching model still encodes the leading theory of equilibrium unemployment,
but runs into diculties when applied to business cycles. As Shimer (2005) demonstrated,
this model cannot reconcile the large cyclical swings in job nding and unemployment rates
with the tiny ones in Average Labor Productivity (ALP), or in other plausible sources of
aggregate shocks, that we observe in the US economy. The perfectly competitive labor
market model failed this test because it requires an implausibly elastic aggregate labor
supply; the same issue came back to haunt the search-cum-bargaining model (Hagedorn
and Manovskii, 2008). The attention then turned to other sources of wage rigidity. We
add to this range of new hypotheses. The simple Coasian assumption of commitment to
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wage oers to exploit market power, here conferred by frictions and tempered by on-the-job
search, is a natural source of wage rigidity, in an environment that can also explain wage
inequality and reallocation and that is very well understood in steady state since BM.
In our past theoretical work, we outlined the scope and limitations of wage posting
models with random search in the presence of aggregate shocks to labor productivity. Our
main empirical focus was on the cyclical reallocation of employment among heterogenous
rms (MPV12). Our contribution here is to evaluate the quantitative performance of our
MPV13 business cycle wage-posting model against empirical evidence on unemployment and
wage uctuations, as well as on wage inequality and the pace of reallocation as is standard
in this approach. To that end, we propose a tractable, stochastic equilibrium version of the
BM model | we will refer to is as the \Stochastic BM" (SBM) model | and an operational
algorithm to simulate it.
Unlike in bargaining models, in wage- (or, more generally, contract-) posting models
such as (S)BM, equilibrium wages are allocative, so they can be unambiguously related
to empirical evidence on earnings inequality, dynamics, and cyclicality. Dierent varieties
of wage-posting models with on-the-job search successfully introduced aggregate shocks,
by making one key change to the environment. Menzio and Shi (2011) assume perfect
information about posted wages, in the tradition of directed or competitive search, and study
business cycle movements in labor market quantities, but not in wages. Closer to our exercise,
Robin (2011) maintains random search, but relaxes the full commitment assumption, to
introduce Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)'s sequential auctions. Firms can respond to outside
oers to their employees, which critically changes the ex ante incentives of forward-looking
rms and workers to post and to accept wage oers. This assumption also greatly simplies
the analysis of business cycles. Robin addresses empirical evidence on both labor market
ows and wages. Relative to these two alternatives, computation of equilibrium wages in our
SBM model is less straightforward. Yet, as we show, it is still feasible and reasonably fast
using an algorithm that we oer here. We build on the simple structure of equilibrium, which
is Rank-Preserving (MPV09): more productive and larger rms always oer higher values
to all workers, independently of the history of aggregate shocks. Thus, workers always move
in the same direction between jobs, equilibrium turnover is trivial to simulate, and generates
empirically accurate predictions about job ladder movements over business cycles (MPV14).
Our harder task now is to compute the equilibrium contracts, or state-contingent wages,
that implement this equilibrium allocation.
The broader goal of this project is to provide a unied explanation, based on a stochastic
job ladder, for both unemployment uctuations and wages, individual dynamics and cyclical-
ity of earnings and turnover. This is a very ambitious goal. In this rst quantitative step, to
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give our model a reasonable chance, we introduce a seemingly minor but important change
relative to MPV13. Following Pissarides (2009)'s suggestion, we model adjustment frictions
on the rm side as a cost that depends on the volume of hires, and not of vacancies or job
adverts, as is customary. That is, the rm pays for the output of its recruiting activities,
not for the inputs into it. As such, hiring costs are best thought of as training costs. Search
for trading partners is still mediated by a matching function. Modeling recruitment costs as
hiring costs tames congestion eects, which facilitate hiring in recessions, when unemploy-
ment is abundant, thus mute the negative impact of aggregate shocks on job creation (see
Christiano et al., 2013). This change in the model requires a new argument to prove that
equilibrium remains unique and RP. We nd that this property, essential for tractability,
requires a restriction on the convexity of the hiring cost function.1
We gauge our SBM model's quantitative performance along three main dimensions.
First, we assess the model's ability to amplify TFP shocks, based on its predictions about
the volatility and covariances of unemployment, the job nding rate and the vacancy-
unemployment (V=U) ratio, in the face of TFP shocks of a plausible magnitude. Second,
we examine wage exibility in the model, as measured by the wage-unemployment semi-
elasticity (on which we incidentally provide new evidence from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation | SIPP), and the time-series volatility of mean log wages. Third,
we re-examine the BM model's predictions about cross-sectional dispersion in wages, prots,
and employer sizes | all issues that have been the focus of many analyses of the steady-state
BM model. In so doing, we highlight new connections between the model's cross-sectional
and business-cycle predictions.
Our summary assessment of the successes and failures of this SBM model is as follows.
A clear success of the SBM model is its ability to generate plausible amplication of TFP
shocks. For example, the predicted volatility ratio of the job nding rate relative to ALP,
which has been the focus of much attention in the literature, can be as high 15, well in line
with the data. Yet, wages in the SBM model are much more exible than they appear to be
in the data: the model-based wage-unemployment semi-elasticity is up to ten times larger
than the one we estimate from SIPP data. How, then, does the model generate plausible
amplication? First, even though wages are very exible, worker values, which are what
agents care about and what, ultimately, matters for the allocation, are much less so. Second,
and most importantly, the model generates amplication by concentrating hiring amongst
rms at the bottom of the productivity ladder. Those low-productivity rms generate a
1Coles and Mortensen (2012) adopt a hiring cost function in the same spirit as ours and impose even
more stringent conditions to extend the scope of our early work on transitional dynamics (MPV09). They
establish existence and characterization of one RP equilibrium also in the presence of idiosyncratic, rm-level
TFP shocks.
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low surplus, so that even with exible wages, small uctuations in productivity cause large
(proportional) variations in protability (and consequently on hiring) for those rms (as per
the intuition put forward in a dierent context by Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008).
This amplication mechanism highlights a trade-o between aggregate volatility of un-
employment and cross-sectional dispersion in employer size. We achieve concentration of
hiring at low-productivity rms by assuming a very highly convex recruitment (or train-
ing) cost function. This strong degree of diminishing returns to hiring tames the incentives
of highly-productive rms to hire much more than low-productivity rms. Dispersion in
gross hiring ows between high- and low- productivity rms is therefore very small and, as
a consequence, so is dispersion in equilibrium size between rms. The largest rm in the
simulated economy is only about four times the size of the smallest one, a number which is
obviously nowhere near what is observed in the data. This tension between size dispersion
and amplication is arguably the key link between the model's cross-sectional and dynamic
predictions.
Next, the SBM model tends to understate cross-sectional wage dispersion. This is not
a new nding: as pointed out by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011), if the residual
wage dispersion observed in US data was truly the result of search frictions, a jobless worker
searching for jobs should wait to sample a high paying job. But average unemployment
duration in the U.S., as measured in the Current Population Survey, is short.2 On-the-job
search helps to resolve this tension, at least qualitatively, because accepting quickly a low
oer does not `burn' all of the option value of looking for a better wage. But estimation of
the steady-state BM model found that the opportunity cost of work must be extremely low
to reconcile empirical observations on the pace of transition and on wage inequality. Like its
steady-state relative, the SBM model is aected by those issues, which are largely orthogonal
to time-series uctuations.
Finally, as we highlighted in previous work (MPV13), the model oers a natural expla-
nation for our observation (MPV12) that net job creation is more negatively correlated with
aggregate unemployment at large than at small rms. In the SBM model this still holds,
although, as mentioned, exactly the opposite is true of gross job creation, which is the source
of aggregate volatility in job nding rates. Intuitively, in an aggregate expansion, small em-
ployers hire proportionally more new workers than larger competitors, but lose even more
employees to their poaching, so their employment grows more slowly on net. The opposite
2Using data from the Survey of Income and Program participation (SIPP), Fujita and Moscarini (2013)
show that unemployment duration in the US is shortest for the large share of workers who end up being
recalled by their former employers, and is in fact much longer than commonly thought, even in good times,
for those unemployed workers who are hired by new employers, which is presumably what search models are
really about. The CPS does not contain information that allow to make this distinction.
4
occurs in recessions, the Great Recession being a perfect example (MPV14).3 The disconnect
in the model between the cyclicality of gross and net job creation among heterogeneous rms
is critical. Bils et al. (2012) show, in a DMP-style model, that a similar tension between
aggregate volatility and cross-sectional inequality on the worker side cannot be resolved.
They observe that the importance of small surplus emphasized by Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) applies to the marginal, and not to the average, labor supply. Hence, they ask whether
worker ex ante skill heterogeneity can amplify the eect of aggregate shocks on the average
job nding rate, by concentrating job nding volatility among low-skill individuals, whose
surplus from work over leisure is small. They show that this is indeed the case only if the
calibrated model also delivers job nding rates for high wage workers that are far too sticky
relative to the data. Just like large, productive rms exhibit surprisingly cyclical net job
creation rates, so high-wage, productive workers face surprisingly cyclical exit rates from
unemployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the SBM model and
characterizes (conditions) for equilibrium to be RP, hence computable. Section 3 studies
steady state equilibrium and its comparative statics properties when changing aggregate
productivity. This is a warm-up towards our quantitative analysis, which is based on empiri-
cal moments presented in Section 4, and is illustrated in Section 5, calibration and simulation
results. After some concluding remarks, the Appendix contains the proofs of the formal ar-
guments and presents the structure of the computation algorithm.
2 A wage-posting model of the business cycle
2.1 The environment
Our Stochastic BM (SBM) model is a variant of MPV13's business cycle model of a frictional
labor market with random search and wage posting. In this version, we introduce rm-level
hiring costs that depend on the output of the hiring process, namely on the ow of hires,
rather than on the input, vacancies or job ads. So hiring costs are best thought of as a
combination of search and training costs. As emphasized by Pissarides (2009), hiring costs
are independent of competition in the market, hence, unlike vacancy costs, they do not fall
in recessions, when labor demand is lower, and do not mute the eect of aggregate shocks.4
3Kahn and McEntarfer (2014) use matched employer-employee US data to order employers on the job
ladder by the average wage they pay, and nd direct evidence for this cyclical poaching pattern.
4This assumption is taken up in a growing number of contributions to the topic at hand, including the
closely related paper by Coles and Mortensen (2013). In their paper, recruitment costs are specied as
Lc(h=L), where L is initial rm size and h is the inow of new hires, so that h=L is the number of new hires
per incumbent worker in the rm.
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Time t = 0; 1; 2 : : : is discrete. The labor market is populated by a unit-mass of workers,
who can be either employed or unemployed, and by a unit measure of rms.5 Workers and
rms are risk neutral, innitely lived, and maximize payos discounted with common factor
 2 (0; 1). Firms operate constant-return technologies with labor as the only input and with
productivity scale !tp, where !t 2 
 is an aggregate component, evolving according to a
stationary rst-order Markov processQ (d!t+1 j !t), and p is a xed, rm-specic component,
distributed across rms p according to a c.d.f.   over some positive interval

p; p

.
The labor market is aected by search frictions in that unemployed workers can only
sample job oers sequentially with some probability t 2 (0; 1] at time t and, while searching,
enjoy a value of leisure bt. Employed workers earn a wage and also sample job oers with
probability st 2 (0; 1] each period, so that s is the search intensity of employed relative
to unemployed job seekers. Workers receive at most one job oer per time period. Each
employed worker is separated from his employer and enters unemployment every period with
probability t 2 (0; 1]. All rms of equal productivity p start out with the same labor force
L0 (p). We denote by Lt (p) the size of a rm of type p at time t on the equilibrium path,
and Nt (p) =
R p
p
Lt (x) d  (x) the cumulated population distribution of employment across
rm types. So N0 (p) is the (given) initial measure of employment at rms of productivity
at most p, Nt (p) is employment and ut = 1 Nt (p) the unemployment (rate) at time t.
We maintain throughout the assumption that the destruction rate is exogenous and a
function of the aggregate productivity state t =  (!t). Similarly for the ow value of non
production bt = b (!t). The job-contact probability t instead is determined in equilibrium
by a matching function. Each period, the rm can hire h workers at cost c(h), with c ()
positive, strictly increasing and convex, continuously dierentiable. To do so, before workers
have a chance to search, a rm can post a  0 job adverts (vacancies). Own job adverts
determine the rm's sampling weight in workers' job search, while total job adverts determine
the rate at which any one advert returns contacts with workers. Let at (p) denote the adverts
posted on the equilibrium path by a rm of productivity p, size Lt 1 (p), and dene aggregate
adverts At and aggregate search eort by workers Zt as
At =
Z p
p
at (p) d  (p)
Zt = 1 Nt 1 (p) + (1  t) sNt 1 (p) :
(1)
The latter adds the previously unemployed to the previously employed who are not displaced
and draw a chance to search this period t. In each time period, employed and unemployed
5A rm can be inactive when its productivity is too low relative to the worker value of leisure. So the unit
measure of rms includes all potential producers, active and inactive. That the mass of rms and workers
both have measure one is obviously innocuous and only there to simplify the notation.
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search simultaneously. Then:
tAt = tZt = m (At; Zt)  min hAt; Zti (2)
where t is the chance for any advert to contact a worker, m() is a linearly homogeneous
matching function, increasing and concave in each argument.
The timing within a period is as follows. Given a current state !t of aggregate labor
productivity and distribution of employed workers Nt:
1. rms produce and sell output and pay workers in state !t; the ow benet bt accrues
to unemployed workers;
2. the new state !t+1 of aggregate labor productivity is realized;
3. employed workers can quit to unemployment;
4. lled jobs are destroyed exogenously with chance t+1;
5. rms post job adverts at+1;
6. the remaining employed workers receive an outside oer with chance st+1 and de-
cide whether to accept it or to stay with the current employer; simultaneously, each
previously unemployed worker receives an oer with probability t+1;
7. rms hire workers and pay hiring costs that depend on how many workers they hire.
Finally, in order to avert unnecessary complications, and to simplify the illustration, we
assume that the state space 
 is nite, the distribution of rm types,  , has continuous and
everywhere strictly positive density  =  0 over

p; p

, and the initial measure of employment
across rm types, N0, is continuously dierentiable in p.
2.2 The rm's contract-posting and hiring problem
Each rm of type p chooses and commits to an employment contract, namely a state-
contingent wage wt (p) depending on aggregate productivity !t and the employment dis-
tribution Nt 1 (), to maximize the present discounted value of prots at time 0, given other
rms' contract oers. The dependence of the wage on the state f!t; Nt 1 ()g is marked as a
shorthand by the time index of the wage. The rm is further subjected to an equal treatment
constraint, whereby it must pay the same wage to all its workers. Under commitment, such
a wage function implies an equilibrium value Vt (p) for any worker to work for that rm.
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We introduce some notation. Let
Ft (W ) =
1
At
Z p
p
I fVt (p)  Wg at (p) d  (p) : (3)
denote the c.d.f. of values posted by all rms and oered to searching workers, with F t () =
1  Ft (), i.e. Ft is the distribution of values from which job searchers draw from,
Gt (W ) =
1
Nt (p)

Z p
p
I fVt (p)  Wg dNt (p) (4)
denote the c.d.f. of values accruing to the currently employed workers, and let
Ut = bt + Et

(1  t+1)Ut+1 + t+1
Z
max hv; Ut+1i dFt+1 (v)

(5)
be the value of unemployment. The unemployed worker collects a ow value bt and, next
period, when aggregate productivity becomes !t+1, she draws with chance t+1 a job oer
from the distribution of oered values Ft+1, that she accepts if its value exceeds that of
staying unemployed. Each rm now has a sampling weight in F equal to its (normalized)
job posting, a=A.
A rm that observes state !t+1 and decides to post a continuation value Wt+1 < Ut+1
loses all workers, who quit to unemployment, so Lt+1 = 0. Otherwise, a rm of current
size Lt posting any value Wt+1  Ut+1 in aggregate state f!t+1; Nt ()g loses workers to
unemployment, with chance t+1, and to other rms, if its workers draw oers, with chance
st+1, which are more valuable, with chance F t+1 (Wt+1). The rm chooses to hire ht+1
workers. Formally:
Lt+1 = Lt (1  t+1)
 
1  st+1F t+1 (Wt+1)

+ ht+1 (6)
where hires ht+1 = at+1t+1Pt+1 (Wt+1) equal the measure of vacancies posted times the
contact rate of each vacancy times the probability that the oer is accepted:
Pt+1 (Wt+1) =
1 Nt (p) + s (1  t+1)Nt (p)Gt+1 (Wt+1)
Zt+1
(7)
In (7), the denominator is the measure of workers who can make contact, and the numerator
counts only those who accept the oer, namely all the unemployed and only the fraction of
employed who will earn less than Wt+1 by staying where they are.
Two payo-relevant state variables of the rm's problem are aggregate productivity !t
and the distribution of values oered in the market, Ft, which is innitely-dimensional and
determines the retention eects of posting a contract value. These two state variables are
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aggregate and exogenous to the rm. For notational simplicity, we again subsume in a time
index the dependence on (!t; Ft) of rm's and workers' values.
The rm's problem can be formulated recursively (Spear and Srivastava, 1987) by in-
troducing an additional, ctitious state variable, namely the continuation utility V that the
rm promised at time t  1 to deliver to the worker from this period t on. So the rm solves
t
 
V ; Lt

= sup
wt0
ht+10
Wt+1Ut+1
D
(!tp  wt)Lt + Et [ c (ht+1) + t+1 (Wt+1; Lt+1)]
E
(8)
subject to the law of motion (6) of rm size and a Promise-Keeping (PK) constraint to
deliver the promised V :
V = wt + Et
"
t+1Ut+1 + (1  t+1)
 
1  st+1F t+1 (Wt+1)

Wt+1
+ (1  t+1) st+1
Z +1
Wt+1
vdFt+1 (v)
#
: (9)
Expectations are taken with respect to the future realization !t+1 of aggregate productiv-
ity and consequent employment distribution Nt+1, conditional on the date-t state variable
(!t; Nt).
To characterize the best response contract, we rst describe an equivalent unconstrained
recursive formulation of the contract-posting problem. We dene the joint value of the rm
and its existing workers:
St = t + V Lt:
Solving for the wage wt from (9), replacing it into the rm's Bellman equation (8), and using
(6) to replace the expression for Lt+1 into St+1 = t+1 +Wt+1Lt+1 in each future state, the
joint value function St solves the unconstrained, recursive maximization of the joint value of
the rm-worker collective:
St (p; Lt) = !tpLt + Et
"
t+1LtUt+1 + sup
ht+10
Wt+1Ut+1
*
(1  t) stLt
Z +1
Wt+1
vdFt+1 (v)  c (ht+1)
+ St+1 (p; Lt+1) Wt+1ht+1
+#
(10)
The joint value St to the rm and its existing Lt employees equals ow output, !tpLt, plus the
discounted expected continuation value. This includes (in order) the value of unemployment
for those employees who are displaced exogenously, the value of a new job for those who are
not displaced and nd a better oer than the one extended by the current rm, minus the
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cost of hiring new workers, and, on the second line, the joint continuation value of the rm
and of its current (time t) employees. In turn, the latter equals the joint continuation value
St+1 of the rm and its future workforce | made up of stayers among the current (date-t)
workforce plus next-period (date-t+1) hires | minus the value to be paid to new hires, either
from unemployment or from other rms.6 The optimal policy solving the unconstrained DP
problem (10) also solves (8) subject to (9). We therefore focus on the analysis of the simpler
problem (10).
Denition 1 A Markov (contract-posting) equilibrium is a pair of measurable
functions (V;H) of rm-specic productivity p, rm size L, aggregate productivity !, and
aggregate distribution of employment N such that, for every rm type p, if all other rms
of type x play (V;H) so that (3), (4) and (6) hold with Wt = Vt (x) where Vt (x) =
V (x; Lt 1 (x) ; !t; Nt 1) and ht = Ht (x) where Ht (x) = H (x; Lt 1 (x) ; !t; Nt 1), the value-
posting function Vt (p), the wage function that implements it (i.e. solves (9) with V = Vt (p))
and the hiring function Ht (p) are the optimal policies of the contracting problem (8).
An equilibrium is a xed point, a solution (V;H) to this DP problem that coincides
with the strategy followed by the other rms. The reason why strategies depend on the
employment distribution Nt, rather than the oer distribution Ft, is simple. Given the
equilibrium value-oer strategy V and the employment distribution Nt, any rm of type
p can compute for every competitor x the probability Gt (Vt (x)) from (4) and thus the
acceptance probability Pt (Vt (x)) from (7). Given the equilibrium hiring strategy H, rm p
can then derive the required vacancy posting at (x) = Ht (x) =tPt (Vt (x)) of any other rms
x. Finally, Ft derives from (3). So knowledge of equilibrium strategies (a requirement of
equilibrium) and of the employment distribution Nt suce to characterize all other innite-
dimensional state variables.
2.3 Rank-Preserving Equilibrium (RPE)
2.3.1 Denition of RPE
The main diculty in characterizing equilibrium in BM's environment in the presence of
aggregate uncertainty, which hampered progress of this approach to the analysis of business
cycles, is now clear. The oer distribution Ft is relevant to the rm maximization problem,
6If we did not subtract this cost of employing new hires, this Bellman equation would generate the joint
value of the rm and all of its workers, current and future. If this were the object maximized by the rm,
it would optimally oer its workers the maximum value, i.e. pay a wage equal to productivity (the proof,
omitted, is available upon request). As is standard, the ecient solution to a moral hazard problem is to
\sell the rm to the workers" . In our economy, however, rms do not pursue eciency, but maximize prots.
Therefore, the optimal value-oer policy is an interior solution.
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because it determines the retention rate Ft (W ) of the rm's employees who are oered a
contract of value W . This is a dening property of a random search, wage posting model.
Hence Ft, or alternatively the employment distribution Nt, is a state variable of the rm
problem. Even if the rm does not directly control this aggregate state variable, keeping
track of it is an innitely complex problem.
A particularly simple class of equilibria circumvents this hurdle.
Denition 2 A Rank-Preserving Equilibrium (RPE) is a Markov equilibrium such
that, on the equilibrium path, a more productive rm always oers its workers a higher
continuation value: Vt (p) = V (p; Lt 1 (p) ; !t; Nt 1) is increasing in p, including the eect
of p on rm size Lt 1 (p).
As a direct consequence of the above denition, in a RPE, workers rank their preferences
to work for dierent rms according to rm productivity at all dates. The RP property
holds in the unique steady-state equilibrium characterized by BM. Denition 2 proposes to
extend it to a dynamic stochastic equilibrium with endogenous hiring.
2.3.2 A characterization result
The key contribution of MPV13 is the proof that, in BM's original environment with exoge-
nous (but stochastic) contact rates, any Markov equilibrium must be Rank-Preserving under
the weak sucient condition that more productive rms start weakly larger at time 0. Thus,
for any history of realizations of aggregate shocks, more productive and larger rms always
oer their workers a higher value, which is the only available tool to control both hiring
and retention. Therefore, the size ranking of rms is preserved over time: if Lt (p)  Lt (p0)
for p > p0 at date t, then Lt+1 (p) > Lt+1 (p0). Thus, by induction, Lt+n (p) > Lt+n (p0)
for all positive integers n: if a more productive rm is ever larger, it will remain larger for
ever no matter what happens to aggregate productivity, because it will oer a higher value
to retain its workers and hire more workers. Furthermore, the equilibrium evolution of the
employment distribution is the same in any RPE, so it is uniquely pinned down.
In this paper, we add a hiring choice h to the rm's problem. The RP property alone
therefore no longer suces to ensure that more productive rms also hire more and, conse-
quently, always remain larger. Oering a higher value only guarantees a better retention of
existing employees, a reduction in the outow, but rm size also depends on the gross hiring
inow h. Therefore, the conditions for the unique equilibrium of any kind to be RP as in
MPV13, are slightly stronger, and the argument for the preservation of size ranking is not as
straightforward. Yet we show in the following proposition that preservation of size ranking
continues to hold in that case.
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Proposition 1 (RPE with Hiring Costs) Assume rms incur hiring costs c (h) to hire
h workers, where c() is a C 2 function with c0(h) > 0 for all h > 0. Then any Markov
contract-posting Equilibrium such that the sampling c.d.f. Ft() is everywhere dierentiable
at all dates is Rank-Preserving if:
1. more productive rms are weakly larger at the initial date, i.e. L0(p) is non-decreasing
2. the elasticity of c0(), "(c0) = hc00(h)=c0(h), is everywhere larger than 1.
Moreover, in any such RPE, size ranking is preserved at all dates, i.e. Lt(p) is non-
decreasing at all t.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 extends the characterization result of MPV13 to the case of endogenous
hiring, where rms face recruitment costs that are a function of their gross hiring inow. It
states (a pair of) sucient conditions for any Markov equilibrium of our model, within the
class of equilibria with dierentiable sampling c.d.f.'s, to be RP.7
2.3.3 Some useful properties of RPE
Three properties thus hold true in any RPE. First, the share of rms that oer less than
Vt (p) is simply the proportion of rms that are less productive than p weighted by their
relative vacancy postings
Ft (Vt (p)) =
1
At
Z p
p
at (x) d  (x) : (11)
Second, the share of employed workers who earn a value that is lower than that oered by
p equals the share of employment at rms less productive than p:
Gt (Vt (p)) =
Nt 1 (p)
Nt 1 (p)
: (12)
Third, the probability that an oer is accepted equals
Pt+1 (Vt+1 (p)) =
1 Nt (p) + s (1  t+1)Nt (p)
1 Nt (p) + s (1  t+1)Nt (p) := Yt (p) : (13)
Therefore at(p) = Ht(p)= (tYt(p)), and we can write the sampling weight as a function of
the chosen hiring ow. As we will see shortly, these restrictions will drastically simplify the
computation of equilibrium in the stochastic model.
7The restriction to dierentiable c.d.f.'s simplies the proof, but we suspect it is inessential - it is not
imposed in MPV13.
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In MPV13 we further establish that on the RPE path the value Vt (p) oered to workers is
continuous in p and the joint value S (p; L; !t; Nt) of a rm of type p and of its L employees
is dierentiable in L. Our focus in this paper is on computation. Therefore, we restrict
attention to dierentiable equilibria without formally extending MPV13's dierentiability
proof to the case of endogenous hiring. Exploiting the dierentiability properties of the
equilibrium we are seeking to characterize, we dene the costate variable
t (p) =
@St
@L
(p; L (p)) =
@S
@L
(p; L (p) ; !t; Nt)
which is the shadow marginal value of an additional worker to the rm-employees collective.
Using the RP implications (11) and (12) in the Bellman equation (10), dierentiating the
latter on both sides with respect to Lt, and invoking the Envelope theorem:
t (p) = !tp+ Et
"
t+1Ut+1 + (1  t+1)

1  st+1
At+1
Z p
p
at+1 (x) d  (x)

t+1 (p)
+ (1  t+1) st+1
At+1
Z p
p
at+1 (x)Vt+1 (x) d  (x)
#
(14)
where in the last integral we changed variable from value V  Ft to productivity p   .
The equilibrium policies Vt (p) and Ht (p) solve the NFOCs for the maximization of (10):
[W ] : Ht(p) = [t(p)  Vt(p)] (1  t) stLt 1ft (Vt(p))
[h] : c0 (Ht(p)) = t(p)  Vt(p): (15)
Next, noticing that (11) implies
ft (Vt(p)) =
dFt (Vt(p))
dVt(p)
=
dFt (Vt(p))
dp
1
V 0t (p)
=
at(p)
At
(p)
V 0t (p)
;
we can rewrite the FOC for W as
Ht(p) = [t(p)  Vt(p)] (1  t) stLt 1(p)at(p)
At
(p)
V 0t (p)
(16)
Together with the law of motion of employment, equations (14), (16) and (15) are the
backbone of an algorithm to describe the evolution of the equilibrium of this economy subject
to aggregate shocks. We provide the details of this algorithm in Appendix C
3 Steady state and comparative statics
Before moving on to the quantitative results, in order to gain some intuition on the com-
plex eects of shocks to aggregate productivity ! on average employment and wage, and
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distributions thereof, we compare steady-state equilibria with dierent values of !. More
precisely, we assume that !t is constant for ever at !, the economy is in steady state, so
any transitional dynamics of the employment distribution Nt already played out, we describe
equilibrium, which extends BM to endogenous contact rates, and study the eects of changes
in ! on the steady state N and wages.
In our previous theoretical analysis, in equilibrium a rm of productivity !tp may decide
to post a value Vt (p) below the value of unemployment Ut. Because any equilibrium must
be RP, i.e. Vt () must be increasing, if this happens then generically it will be true for all
rms with productivity type below some threshold p
t
, and a measure  0(pt) of rms will be
temporarily inactive. So the model allows for entry and exit \at the bottom". As !t evolves
stochastically, so will the entry threshold p
t
. To understand comparative statics, we need to
study this eect carefully.
So let
p (!) = max

p;

!
;
wmin
!

(17)
denote the lowest-productivity rm active in the market, where p is the lowest existing (po-
tentially active) rm type,  =  (!) is the reservation wage, the minimum wage acceptable
by unemployed workers, to be found later, and wmin is a mandated minimum wage. Let  0
be the population distribution of rm types, and   (p) =  0 (p) = 0(p (!)) its normalized cdf.
Let L (w; a) denote the steady state size when posting a constant wage w and a adverts.
The rm maximizes steady-state ow prots, which equal ow output minus wage per
worker, times rm size, minus the cost of hiring an inow given by posted adverts a times
the stationary contact probability of each advert  times the acceptance probability P (w).8
Denote the optimal level of prot attained by a type-p rm by:
 (p) = max
a0
wmaxh;wmini
L (w) (!p  w)  c (aP (w)) : (18)
This program gives rise to an optimal policy (a(p); w(p)). Proceeding as in Bontemps et al.
(2000), in Appendix B we show that the steady state equilibrium rm size with endogenous
sampling weights equals
L(p) =

1 + s
1  


a(p)
A

1 + s
1  

Z p
p
a(y)
A
d (y)
 2
and the wage policy w = w (p) is the implicit function dened by
w = !
"
p 
Z p
p
L(x)
L(p)
dx
#
 	(w; p; s) (19)
8Maximization of steady-state prot ows coincides with full dynamic maximization of the PDV of future
prots when rms are innitely patient. If not, the two problems yield solutions that produce the same
steady-state allocation. See MPV13 for a detailed comparison.
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where
	 (w; p; s) =
 + c (a (p)P (w))
L (p)
;
and  are the total prots earned by the marginal rm in the market. Such prots are zero
unless neither the reservation wage  nor the statutory minimum wage are binding, in which
case the least productive rm is active: p(!) = p. Since 	 is increasing in w, Equation (19)
uniquely denes w (p). Intuitively, the rm's mark-up comprises two terms: the integral in
(19) captures market power due to frictions, as in the BM model and in Bontemps et al.
(2000), while 	 compensates the rm for hiring costs (which are new to this wage-posting
model) and for the minimum rent it can earn in the market,   0, per worker.
Furthermore, the reservation wage  solves:
 = b+ 
Z w

[1  (1  )s] 

R p
x
a(y)
A
d (y)
1  (1  )

1  s R p
x
a(y)
A
d (y)
dx: (20)
The steady-state equilibrium wage function thus solves (19) with  dened in (20) and p (!)
in (17).
We are now ready to take a total derivative of the wage function (19) w.r. to ! to study
comparative statics. Note that the value of leisure b, the arrival rate of separation shocks
, of job oers  and of job applications , as well as the advertising policy a() and their
aggregate A, hence the acceptance probability P (), all depend on aggregate productivity
!. All of them, except b, inuence the wage policy for a given productivity and reservation
wage. We can then decompose the response as follows:
dw(p)
d!
=
@w(p)
@!| {z }
Opportunity Cost
+!
L
 
p

L(p)
dp(!)
d!| {z }
Entry/Exit
+
X
x2f;;;a;A;bg
@w(p)
@x
dx(!)
d!| {z }
Competition
(21)
where the minimum productivity responds as follows:
dp(!)
d!
=  wmin
!2
I

wmin > ; !p
	
+

!2

d log 
d log!
  1

I

 > wmin; !p
	
(22)
We study the three pieces of (21) in turn.
Opportunity cost. The rst eect is the direct impact of the productivity scale: some
algebra yields
@w (p)
@!
!
w (p)
=
1 + 	(w(p);p;s)
w
1 + 	(w(p);p;s)
w
@ log	(w(p);p;s)
@ logw
This reects the higher opportunity cost (due to a loss of output) of not hiring/retaining
workers that a rm pays when ! increases. Suppose all rms keep their wage oers xed
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as ! rises to !0 > !. Then rm p will go from productivity !p to !0p. Given the strategy
of other rms, value of leisure, and arrival rates, this rm will optimize by mimicking rm
p0 = p!0=!: whether the rm is more productive for idiosyncratic or aggregate reasons is
immaterial to its choice, given a wage oer distribution and arrival rates. So rm p will raise
its wage oer to w (p0) > w (p), and, in equilibrium, all rms will raise their wages.
The elasticity of the wage function with respect to aggregate productivity ! is less than
one, so wages are \rigid", if and only if the elasticity of the mark-up term 	 with respect
to the wage, evaluated at equilibrium wage w (p), is larger than one. In the important and
simple special case analyzed by BM, hiring is costless, contact rates are exogenous, and
either the minimum wage or the reservation wage are binding, so that a positive measure
 0(p (!)) of rms is inactive and prots of the marginal rm are zero:  = 0. In this case,
the mark-up term 	 is zero, and all wages rise proportionally to aggregate productivity.
If  = 0 but hiring is costly, the mark-up term 	 equals hiring costs per worker, so the
wage w (p) is rigid if the wage elasticity of total hiring costs exceeds one. Since rms pay
hiring costs only if they hire (c(0) = 0; c0 > 0) and the marginal hiring cost is increasing
(which is implied by the condition for RP in Proposition 1), the elasticity of c() exceeds
one. Therefore, the equilibrium wage w (p) is rigid if the wage elasticity of the acceptance
probability P (w) exceeds one at w = w (p). Intuitively, if an increase in ! leads rm to oer
a higher wage, and this oer poaches many workers at the margin, the rm needs to pay for
these additional hires. So the rising marginal hiring cost moderates the incentives to raise
the wage in the rst place. This is a novel eect that arises from endogenizing hiring choices
in a job ladder model.
Entry and exit. The second eect is the impact of aggregate productivity on the set
of active rms, i.e. the entry/exit eect. This eect is zero if neither minimum wage nor
reservation wage bind, and all rms make positive prots. Otherwise, an increase in ! will
pull some relatively unproductive rms into the market. The resulting negative eect on
wages depends on L(p)=L(p), which is exactly equal to one at the bottom and decreasing in
p. So the impact of aggregate productivity on wages through the entry/exit margin dissipates
as we move up and away from that margin, and top wages are fairly insulated.
Competition. The third eect is indirect impact of aggregate productivity on wage com-
petition through the pace of separations (!) and the general equilibrium response of the
arrival of outside oers to employed and unemployed workers  and of job applications ,
as well as the advertising policy a() and their aggregate A and the acceptance probability
P (), given job productivities and set of active rms. Here we can make two remarks on the
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eects of  and  on the slope w0(p) of the equilibrium wage function, given the reservation
wage .
First, , which depends in equilibrium on job market tightness, only enters the wage
function as s, i.e. this eect is
@w (p)
@
= s
@w (p)
@ (s)
:
This implies that a change in the arrival rate  of oers to the unemployed has no direct eect
on equilibrium wages, and will work only through the reservation wage . What matters
for wage competition above  is the arrival rate of oers to employed workers, which is the
true index of competition. This is a sense in which rm's commitment insulates wages from
a direct inuence of the value of unemployment, as in (but for very dierent reasons than)
Hall and Milgrom (2008)'s credible bargaining.
Second, the destruction rate  has the opposite eect to  on the slope of the wage policy,
plus an extra negative eect through the term 	. Given (1 )=, an increase in  raises the
minimum prots that the rm must make to match the minimum rent in the market and to
compensate the upfront hiring cost, hence reduces wages across the board. In BM's steady
state analysis, as mentioned 	 = 0, and (1   )= is a summary index of competition. If
trading frictions are extreme s(1   )= = 0, we can easily verify from the equations that
the unique solution is w(p) =  = b for all p, the Diamond (1971) paradox. Since (1  )=
is increasing in aggregate productivity !, so is the slope of the wage function and, given ,
equilibrium wages, purely due to this competition eect.
4 Data
4.1 Labor market and productivity
Most of the aggregate time series that we exploit to either calibrate or test the model
are available at monthly frequency. Nonetheless, we sample and lter them at quarterly
frequency, because TFP and Average Labor Productivity (ALP) series are available only
quarterly. The will calibrate and simulate the model at monthly frequency, then aggregate
its output to quarterly frequency for consistency with the data.
We take logs of and HP-lter all quarterly time series. Labor market stocks and ows
are ltered with parameter 100,000, while productivity series with parameter 1,600. The
unemployment rate is the civilian unemployment rate of the US population aged 16 and up
from the BLS, starting in 1948:Q1 and currently available through 2014:Q3. We calculate
transition rates between labor market states. Employment and Unemployment using stocks
of E and U and ows EU and UE between them from the BLS. Flows are from monthly CPS
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U UE EU V=U TFP ALP
unemployment rate :204
UE rate  :973 :124
EU rate :887  :878 :100
V=U ratio  :963 :962  :921 :357
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) :082 :154 :054  :188 :009
Average Labor Productivity (ALP)  :210  :063  :239  :010 :197 :013
Table 1: Correlations and standard deviations of quarterly cyclical components
matched les (BLS \Research series on labor force status ows from the CPS") beginning
in 1990. We do not use unemployment-duration based measures, nor do we correct for time
aggregation (Shimer, 2012) and we treat any short spell of unemployment that completes
within a month, and is missed by monthly CPS interviews, as a continuous employment spell.
We make this choice for two reasons: the model is calibrated monthly, so workers there have
no chance to make more than one transition per month, and in the data a majority of very
short unemployment spells end in recall by the same employer (Fujita and Moscarini, 2013).
The V=U ratio is the ratio between the JOLTS vacancy rate (currently available for
2010:Q4-2014:Q1) for the US private nonfarm sector and the civilian unemployment rate.9
For TFP we use quarterly estimates of the Solow residual corrected for capacity utilization
by Fernald (2012), which are updated by the author and currently cover the period 1947:Q1-
2014:Q2. For ALP, we take Output per job in the Nonfarm business sector from the BLS
(series PRS85006163), currently available for 1947:Q1-2014:Q3.
We report in Table 1 standard deviations (last number on each row) and correlation
coecients of the ltered components of each series. Because the series are available for
dierent time spans, the second moments in the table refer to dierent time periods. We
prefer to take this approach rather than to shorten our sample to the longest common period
when they are all available. We remark that TFP and ALP have similar volatilities, much
smaller than that of (log) unemployment, but TFP has a stronger negative correlation than
ALP with the unemployment rate. This reects in part the fact that our ltered ALP
measure turned slightly countercyclical since the 1980s.
9This ratio is routinely referred to as labor market tightness in the context of the DMP model. However,
the relevant concept of market tightness in our model, which features on-the-job search, is not the V=U ratio:
rather, it is the ratio of vacancies to total worker search eort, U + s(1  )(1  U). Because the V=U ratio
has been the focus of much attention in the literature, we report statistics pertaining to that variable, even
though it doesn't have a straightforward interpretation within the context of our model.
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log earnings monthly quarterly
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment rate  :60
(:11)
 :50
(:11)
 :58
(:11)
 :49
(:11)
25-99 employees :065
(:004)
:062
(:004)
100+ employees :078
(:005)
:075
(:005)
observations (i; t) 2; 910; 524 986; 149
# workers (i) 82; 036 81; 457
Varit(errors) :18 :18 :16 :16
Et[Vari(errors)] .18 :18 :16 :16
R2 :22 :23 :23 :24
Notes: Source: SIPP. Monthly unemployment rate is HP-ltered with parameter 10E5. Quarterly
log earnings and unemployment rate are averages of monthly series. Et[Vari(errors)] is time average
of the cross-sectional variance of errors in each period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
specications include quartic time trend and demographic controls.
Table 2: Fixed-eect regression of individual real log earnings
4.2 Wages
We use the 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Partic-
ipation (SIPP). This is a collection of panels of workers, on average about 40,000 workers
per panel. Each worker is surveyed every four months about events that occurred over the
past four months (`wave'). Workers are divided in rotation groups, so each calendar month
roughly one quarter of the panel completes a wave and is re-interviewed. The SIPP has
signicant longitudinal and time dimensions, provides information about a large number of
individual outcomes, and is nationally representative.
As the model has no intensive margin of labor supply, for our measure of wages we
take monthly earnings (TPMSUM), which are also less contaminated by measurement error
than hourly pay rates, especially those constructed as the ratio of earnings to usual hours
worked per month. We deate with monthly CPI and take logs. A \seam bias" arises from
a tendency of SIPP respondents to bunch reported changes in earnings and labor market
status around interview times. Rotation groups are staggered, however, so seams are evenly
distributed over time. The only exceptions are the rst four and last three months of each
panel, when no rotation group has a seam, but excluding those months has little impact on
the results.
We aim to extract information about the cyclical component of earnings for compara-
ble workers, as our model has homogeneous workers. To this purpose, we run, with both
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monthly and quarterly data, a xed eect regression of individual log earnings, constructed
as described above, on the detrended unemployment rate, a common linear trend, a cubic in
age, and dummies for the four available worker characteristics that may change over time:
class of worker (private, government, no prot etc.), education (17 categories), marital sta-
tus and union coverage. In columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 we also control for a coarse measure
of employed size available in the SIPP data.10 Race, gender and any other time-invariant
worker characteristics are absorbed by the individual xed eect. The regression uses the
SIPP longitudinal weights to maintain the representative character of the sample.
The results in Table 2 indicate a negative semi-elasticity, signicant at conventional levels.
Looking at column 2 and 4, we see that employer size comes out positive and signicant,
as predicted by the theory. The addition of employer size in the set of regressors reduces
(the point estimate of) the unemployment semi-elasticity of wages a bit, likely owing to a
composition eect, also consistent with the theory: periods of low (high) unemployment are
periods in which the workforce is more concentrated among higher-paying and larger (lower-
paying and smaller) employers (we return to this point in the next section). The rst row
of Table 2, specically column 3, provides our empirical target for the cyclicality of wages
produced by the model.
5 Calibration and simulation
5.1 Calibration
We specify the aggregate shock process as a discrete 20-state rst-order Markov chain that
approximates a monthly AR(1) process for ln!. The AR coecient (0:94) and the variance
of innovations (0:006) are set such that the model replicates the observed variance and rst-
order autocorrelation of HP-detrended output per worker.11
The job destruction rate is allowed to uctuate deterministically with ! as follows:
(!) = 0:0114 + 1:894 (ln!max   ln!)2:5
where the intercept, slope and exponents in this denition are chosen to approximate the
mean, standard deviation, (positive) skewness and kurtosis of the observed EU rate.
All other parameter values and functional form assumptions are summarized in Table
3. The discount factor is the monthly equivalent of a 5% discount rate per annum. The
10This measure is an indicator of whether the worker's current rm employs up to 24, between 25 and 99,
or more than 100 people at the time of interview.
11Output per worker does not exactly coincide with ! in the model because of the gradual selection of
workers up the job ladder, but it turns out to be very close.
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monthly discount factor:  = 0:951=12
employed search intensity: s = 0:13
matching function: m(A;Z) = 0:059 A
hiring cost: c(h) = (43:47 h)100 =100
unemployment ow income: b = 0
rm type distribution:  (p) = 1 p
 2:6
1 p 2:6 , with [p; p] = [1; 100]
Table 3: Calibration
employed search intensity s is set to match an average monthly EE transition rate of 1:2%,
in line with SIPP data.12 The matching function is simply a linear function of the aggregate
number of job adverts. This diers from the more commonly used Cobb-Douglas specication
with a vacancy elasticity of 0:5, and as such calls for some comments. First, there is some
evidence that the estimated vacancy elasticity of the matching function is substantially
higher than 0:5 when employed job seekers are counted as inputs into the matching process
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).13. Second, taking simulated series from our model, and
running an OLS regression of the log of the job nding rate on the log of the V=U ratio
(the standard procedure in the empirical literature on matching functions that produced
this \standard value" of 0:5 for the matching function elasticity), we obtain a \matching
function elasticity" of 0:47, well within the range of standard estimates. Finally, results are
not very sensitive to variations of the matching function elasticity within the range [0:7; 1].
The hiring cost function is iso-elastic, and highly convex. The need for a highly convex
hiring cost function is suggested by the sucient condition stated in Proposition 1. In the
simulation, more convex hiring costs tend to (moderately) increase the volatility of the job
nding rate, for reasons discussed in Section 5.3.2. The scaling factor in the hiring cost
function is set so that the aggregate measure of job adverts, A, equals one on average over
the ergodic distribution of ! | a mere normalization.
The unemployment ow income is set equal to 0. Low estimates of b are common in
empirical applications of BM-type models, for the reasons discussed in Hornstein et al.
(2011), and are sometimes justied by appealing to a disutility, or \stigma", attached to the
12There are many dierent ways to dene EE transitions in the SIPP (or any other) data. Here we allow
for up to seven days of non-employment between jobs, and up to a month for \voluntary" EE transitions,
i.e. when respondents stated that they quit their past job to take another one. Adding \involuntary" EE
transitions (in the form of forced job-to-job reallocations, as for instance in Jolivet et al., 2006) would be a
straightforward extension.
13Even when on-the-job search is ignored, recent estimates by Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013) that
account for the endogeneity of vacancies in the presence of reallocation shocks suggest that the matching
function elasticity may be higher than commonly assumed, in the region of 0:8.
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state of unemployment which has to be subtracted from what is literally income in the ow
value of unemployment. However the main reason why we adopt this low value is tractability:
a higher value of b would induce some low-productivity rms to shut down in bad aggregate
states. Working the possibility of rm exit into the simulation is not an easy task, and we
leave it for future research.14
Finally, the underlying distribution of rm types is a truncated Pareto distribution, the
most productive rm being 100 times more productive than the worst one in the economy.
5.2 Main quantitative results and model t
We simulate the model over a window of 70 years (a length comparable to the times series
described in Section 4) using the algorithm described in Appendix C. We now discuss various
aspects of the t and some predictions of the model.
5.2.1 Labor market variables and ALP
Table 4 replicates the data moments displayed in Table 1, together with their model coun-
terparts.15
Although the model tends to understate slightly the volatility of unemployment and
the V=U ratio, it still captures the fact that those labor market indicators are an order of
magnitude more volatile than ALP. This demonstrates the model's potential to generate a
plausible level of amplication of TFP shocks. The model also replicates the correlations
between the various labor market indicators well enough, despite a tendency to overstate the
correlations between the V=U ratio and the job nding and unemployment rates. Overall,
though, the model comes close enough to replicating the moments relating to labor market
variables, including the volatility of the job nding rate, which has been the focus of attention
in much of the recent literature.
Where the model does the least well is in predicting the correlations between ALP and
the various labor market indicators: the magnitudes of all correlations are grossly overstated,
and the model even gets the sign wrong for the correlations of ALP with the job nding rate
and the V=U ratio. This, however, is hardly surprising in a model where the only impulse
driving aggregate uctuations is a TFP shock. Allowing for additional uncorrelated shocks
is like to help with increasing the predicted volatility of the job nding rate, decoupling labor
14We further argue in MPV13 that ignoring entry and exit of rms is not such a big oversight when
analyzing the cyclicality of employment, as the contribution of entry and exit to the cyclical volatility of
employment is modest.
15The quarterly autocorrelation of detrended ALP, not shown in the tables, is 0:77, both in the data and
in the simulation.
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U UE EU V=U ALP
unempl. rate (M) :196
(D) :204
UE rate (M)  :991 :126
(D)  :973 :124
EU rate (M) :828  :751 :111
(D) :887  :878 :100
V=U ratio (M)  :999 :996  :806 :270
(D)  :963 :962  :921 :357
ALP (M)  :726 :659  :865 :709 :013
(D)  :210  :063  :239  :01 :013
Table 4: Fit to correlations and standard deviations of quarterly cyclical components
market indicators from ALP.16
5.2.2 Wages
We construct a model-predicted semi-elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate by run-
ning a weighted OLS regression of rm-level log wages on a constant and on the detrended
unemployment rate, with weights equal to Lt(p)(p). This is the closest we can get, using
the model, to the worker-level regressions reported in Table 2. The predicted semi-elasticity
thus computed (at quarterly frequency) is  6:35. Comparison of this number with the value
of  0:6 reported in the last column of Table 2 suggests that wages are much more procyclical
in the model than in the data (where they are fairly sticky). The predicted semi-elasticity
drops a little to  5:72 when rm size is included among the covariates in the aforementioned
regression. While this drop parallels the drop seen between columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, the
predicted semi-elasticity is still far too large.
As another point of comparison, the quarterly unit labor cost series produced by the BLS
over the period 1947-2013 has a cyclical volatility of 0:016 (after taking logs and HP-ltering
with parameter 1,600). The model counterpart of this number is 0:062, further corroborating
the conclusion that predicted mean wages are too cyclical. Excess wage volatility is a feature
that this model shares with Nash bargaining models, although, as discussed in Section 3, it
arises from very dierent causes in the two models. And contrary to the Nash bargaining
model, the contract posting model does generate plausible amplication of TFP shocks
despite exible wages. Perhaps more informative than wages in this regard, posted worker
16Shocks to the matching technology or to the job destruction rate come to mind as natural candidates.
A recent papers by Hall (2014) makes a case for a countercyclical discount factor.
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values are substantially less volatile than wages, their standard deviation being 0:038 at
quarterly frequency, and their semi-elasticity to unemployment being  1:82. This partly
explains the degree of amplication generated by the model: although wages in the model
are allocative, they merely serve to implement values that drive the allocation of employment
in the model.
As discussed in the Introduction, one of the key contributions of our SBM model is that
it generates endogenous cross-sectional wage dispersion and as such makes predictions on
second- and higher-order moments of the wage distribution. Focusing on cross-sectional
wage dispersion, the pooled cross-section wage variance predicted by the model is 0:03. This
falls far short of the residual variance of 0:18 found in the SIPP data and reported in Table
2. While some of that 0:18 variance is arguably attributable to measurement error, it can
safely be concluded that the model understate wage dispersion.17 The failure to replicate the
observed amount of residual wage dispersion | at least under \standard" parameterizations
| is a well-known and recurring problem of wage posting models (see Hornstein et al., 2011,
and the discussion in the Introduction of this paper), from which the dynamic contract
posting model of this paper is not immune. Just as in the class of steady-state models
discussed by Hornstein et al. (2011), this model could be made to predict levels cross-
section wage dispersion more in line with the data under some extreme parameterizations
involving a large negative ow value of unemployment, or a very high discount rate.18
Without entering the debate about whether such unconventional parameterizations make
sense or not, we take note of the fact that our model under-predicts the level of wage disper-
sion, and move on to its cyclical behavior. A number of recent papers have documented the
fact that idiosyncratic wage risk, broadly dened as the cross-sectional standard deviation
of wage growth, is countercyclical (Storesletten, Tamer and Yaron, 2004). The predicted
correlation between the cross-section standard deviation of log wage growth and the (de-
trended) unemployment rate is 0:21.19 The model thus replicates, at least qualitatively, the
counter-cyclicality of wage risk found in the data.
17Attributing the entire discrepancy between the model-based variance of 0:032 and the data-based
residual variance of 0:18 to classical measurement error would imply a measurement error variance of
0:18   0:03 = 0:15, roughly 83% of the total residual wage variance. This seems high: Lemieux (2006)
reports a corresponding share of around a third based on CPS data.
18For example, assuming b =  93 (which amounts to about  100% of the mean wage) and leaving the
rest of the calibration unchanged, the model predicts a cross-section wage variance of 0:105, which is much
closer to the data, at least if one allows for a reasonable amount of measurement error. Its predictions about
amplication and volatility are virtually unaected by b.
19The model-predicted standard deviation of wage growth is constructed by taking the standard deviation
of rm-level wages weighted by initial employment at each rm. Thus, by design, it measures the wage risk
faced by job stayers.
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Fig. 1: Marginal prots and worker values over time
5.3 Additional quantitative results
5.3.1 Prots and worker values
Figure 1a plots the prole of (log) values posted by each rm, lnVt(p), as a function of the
quantiles of p in the distribution  , over time. Figure 1b does the same for the (log) prof-
itability of the marginal job in any given rm type, ln [t(p)  Vt(p)]. As per the properties
of RPE, Vt(p) is increasing in p at all dates. Figure 1b suggests that this is also the case for
marginal protability, although this result is not guaranteed in theory.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Figure 1 is the relative range of lnVt(p) vs. ln [t(p)  Vt(p)].
Figure 1b indicates that the marginal job at the most productive rm is over 1,000 times
more protable than the marginal job at the least productive rm. By contrast, the high-
est posted value is a mere 11:9% higher than the lowest posted value (which equals U , the
value of unemployment). This is another rendition of the model's failure to generate enough
cross-sectional dispersion in wages (or, in this case, job values): rms at the top of the pro-
ductivity ladder face very little competition, as there are only very few rms that can poach
their workers. As a result, they enjoy a very large amount of market power.
A closer look at Figure 1b further reveals that job protability is much more cyclically
sensitive at low-productivity rms than at the top end of the productivity distribution.
This is because jobs at low-productivity rms generate smaller surplus than jobs at high-
productivity rms, and their value is therefore more elastic to TFP shocks. Interestingly, 1a
suggests that this dierence in cyclicality across rm types is not passed on to worker values.
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Fig. 2: Firm-level job adverts and hiring ows over time
5.3.2 Job adverts, hiring ows, and rm size
Proposition 1 states that in RPE, a rm that is more productive and initially larger than
another stays larger period after period. But its says nothing about whether more productive
rms actually hire more, or if they merely retain a larger fraction of their initial workforce by
posting more attractive job values. Figure 2 provides an answer, under the parameterization
discussed in the previous subsection. Figure 2a plots the prole of rm-level hiring ows,
Ht(p) (still as functions of the quantiles of p in the distribution  ) over time, while Figure 2b
plots the prole of rm-level job adverts, at(p). It appears that Ht(p) is mostly, although not
always increasing in p, while at(p) is frankly decreasing: more productive rms tend to hire a
larger inow of workers at most dates, but manage to do so by spending less eort on hiring,
simply through the fact that they oer more attractive job values, thus enjoying a higher
job-ad yield. Figure 2 further shows that job adverts, and therefore hires, are much more
cyclically sensitive at low-productivity than at high-productivity rms, echoing the similar
remark made above about protability of the marginal job. The rm's hiring decision is
indeed governed by the FOC (15), which imposes equality between the cost of the marginal
hire (c0(h), an increasing function of h), and its protability, (p)  V (p).
Another remarkable feature of Figure 2a is the lack of dispersion in the level of gross
hiring inows across rm types. On average over the simulated sample, the most productive
rm in the market only hires 8:35% more workers per quarter than the least productive
one. This is in spite of a 100-fold dierence in productivity and a 1,000-fold dierence
in protability between the highest- and lowest-productivity employer in this economy (see
previous paragraph). As a further consequence, the model vastly under-predicts dispersion in
rm sizes: the predicted size ratio between the smallest and largest employer in the economy
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is 3:9 on average, nowhere near the levels observed in the data.
The reason for this lack of dispersion in employer size and hiring inow is the very high
degree of convexity of the hiring cost function c(). As mentioned Sub-section 5.1, this high
degree of convexity is needed for the model to amplify TFP shocks to the extent observed
in the data. In that sense, the model carries a tradeo between amplication and size
dispersion, the terms of which are as follows. As seen on Figures 1 and 2, protability and
(consequently) hiring and job-ad posting are much more volatile at low-productivity than at
high-productivity rms, as the former generate a much smaller surplus than the latter. In
order to inate the volatility of aggregate job adverts, the model needs to concentrate hiring
among low-productivity rms. The highly convex training cost does exactly that: it curtails
hiring at high-p rms, which are much more protable than low-p rms but face prohibitive
marginal training costs beyond a modest level of hiring.
5.3.3 The Beveridge curve
Figure 3 shows two dierent versions of the Beveridge curve produced by the model. The blue
plot is the \empirical Beveridge curve", or V U -curve, i.e. a plot of the unemployment rate
against aggregate job adverts. While this V U -curve makes no particular sense in a model
with on-the-job search, it is interesting for being the object of keen empirical investigation,
and the basis for most of the existing inference on matching functions. The red plot on
Figure 3 is the Beveridge curve that is consistent with our model, i.e. a plot of aggregate
worker search eort, 1 Nt(p) + s (1  t)Nt(p), against aggregate job adverts.20
Both versions of the Beveridge curve look as a Beveridge curve should, i.e. are downward
sloping and convex, despite a perfectly countercyclical job destruction rate. Interestingly,
however, the \empirical" Beveridge curve is slightly atter than the \consistent" one. In
other words, if one were to use any of these plots for prediction, one might conclude that a
decrease in labor market tightness by a given amount will cause a larger increase in the mass
of job seekers, hence a larger drop in the job nding rate, under the empirical Beveridge
curve than under the consistent one, which takes employed job seekers into account. This
tallies with the remark made earlier, when discussing calibration: although the true matching
function has a unit elasticity in the model, estimating a misspecied job nding rate based
on the empirical version of the Beveridge curve | i.e. regressing this rate on the V=U ratio
| will understate the sensitivity of the job nding rate to changes in market tightness. The
magnitude of the bias suggested by the model (estimated elasticity of 0:46 instead of 1) is
quite remarkable. Where does the bias come from? The job nding rate is a function not of
20Aggregate worker search eort has been rescaled to produce Figure 3, in such a way that both series on
the x-axis of the gure have equal means.
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the V=U ratio, but of labor market tightness which equals the ratio of aggregate job adverts
(or vacancies) to aggregate job search eort, 1   N(p) + s (1  )N(p), which accounts for
the competition that unemployed workers face from employed job seekers. Because employed
job seekers are fewer in recessions and more in expansions, actual tightness varies relatively
less than the V=U ratio over the cycle, which explains the lower estimated elasticity of the
job nding rate to the V=U ratio than to tightness.
5.3.4 The cyclicality of net job creation
As pointed out earlier, gross job creation is muchmore cyclical among small, low-productivity
employers than at the top end of the productivity distribution. Yet in MPV12 we highlight
that, in US data, exactly the opposite is true of net job creation: as a group, small employ-
ers fare relatively better in bad times of high unemployment, and worse in good times of
low unemployment. As we propose in other work (MPV09, MPV14), this empirical pattern
is qualitatively consistent with job ladder models, of which the model in this paper is an
example: in a tight labor market, high-paying, large employers overcome the scarcity of
unemployed job applicants by poaching employees from smaller, less productive and lower-
paying competitors, whose employment share then shrinks in relative terms. When the
expansion ends, large employers, that were less constrained, have more employment to shed
than small ones. In addition, the resulting high unemployment relaxes hiring constraints on
all employers, particularly the small ones that are less capable of poaching from other rms.
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As a result, small employers downsize less in the recession and grow (relatively) faster in the
recovery.
This mechanism is at work here. To put a number on its magnitude, we construct
series of total net job creation among two groups of rms, one at the top and one at the
bottom of the productivity ladder, both classes being re-designed at each date so that they
each have an employment share of 25%. We then subtract net job creation in the group
of low-p rms from net job creation in the group of high-p rms, and HP-detrend this
dierence to obtain a measure of relative net job creation similar to the series we analyzed
in MPV13. The correlation of this simulated series of relative net job creation with the
simulated unemployment rate is  0:87: as expected, the relative net job creation of large vs.
small employers is procyclical. How plausible the magnitude of that predicted correlation is
hard to assess, for lack of immediately comparable data. In MPV13 we report numbers for
U.S. data that vary between  0:25 and  0:6, depending on the data set, period, sector, etc.
Again, the correlation produced by the model is on the high side of that range, something
that is to be expected as the outcome of a one-shock model.
6 Concluding remarks
The wage-posting model of the labor market with random search is one of the most inuential
and enduring contributions of Dale Mortensen and his students. The main goal of this paper
is to show that this canonical model of the labor market naturally belongs in the toolbox
of business cycle theorists. We study its quantitative performance and confront it with
empirical evidence from the US. This is our rst step in this direction and, as such, is truly
exploratory in nature.
Our exercise reveals dimensions on which the model performs well, and also a fundamental
tension between its predictions for cross-sectional inequality in wages and rm size, and
aggregate volatility. We emphasize that this tension emerges precisely because the model is
unusually equipped to address both sides of this trade-o, inequality and cyclical volatility.
In this regard, the model generates business cycles of the correct magnitude by exploiting
rm heterogeneity, in particular, the concentration of gross hires among unproductive, small,
cyclically sensitive rms. This is more than oset by a strong cyclical response of job to
job quits, so that net job creation is more volatile among large rms, a prediction that in
previous work we argued to be shared by many job ladder models, and that we validated
empirically. We also nd promise in the model's ability to generate cyclical comovement of
the empirically correct sign between unemployment and wage levels, wage inequality, worker
turnover. Much work lies ahead to identify suitable specications and parameterizations of
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hiring costs, state-contingent contracts, search eort that may further improve the model's
quantitative performance along these dimensions.
We believe that additional insights from this stochastic job ladder model lie ahead. An
especially promising direction is understanding individual earnings dynamics, the focus of
the incomplete market literature, their relationship to labor market transitions, up and down
the job ladder, and their cyclicality.
References
[1] Bils, Mark, Y. Chang and S. Kim, (2012), \Comparative advantage and unemployment",
Journal of Monetary Economics, 59(2), 150-165.
[2] Burdett, K. and D. T. Mortensen (1998) \Wage Dierentials, Employer Size and Un-
employment", International Economic Review, 39, 257-73. [BM]
[3] Bontemps, C., J.-M. Robin and G. J. Van den Berg (2000) \Equilibrium Search with
Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory and Nonparametric Estimation", Interna-
tional Economic Review, 41(2), 305-358.
[4] Borowczyk-Martins, D., G. Jolivet and F. Postel-Vinay (2013) \Accounting for Endo-
geneity in Matching Function Estimation", Review of Economic Dynamics, 16, 440-51.
[5] Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum and M. Trabandt (2013) \Unemployment and Business
Cycles", Northwestern University mimeo.
[6] Coase, R. (1972) \Durability and Monopoly", Journal of Law and Economics, 15(1),
143-49.
[7] Coles, M. and D. T. Mortensen (2013) \Equilibrium Wage and Employment Dynamics
in a Model of Wage Posting without Commitment" NBER WP 17284.
[8] Diamond, P. A. (1971) \A Model of Price Adjustment", Journal of Economic Theory,
3, 156-168.
[9] Diamond, P. A. (1982) \Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium", Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 90(5), 881-894.
[10] Fernald, J. (2012) \A Quarterly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on Total Factor Produc-
tivity", Working Paper Series 2012-19, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
[11] Fujita, S. and G. Moscarini (2013) \Recall and Unemployment", NBER WP No. 19640.
30
[12] Hagedorn, M. and I. Manovskii (2008) \The Cyclical Behavior Of Equilibrium Un-
employment and Vacancies Revisited"American Economic Review, September, 98(4),
1692-1706.
[13] Hall, R. E. (2014) \High Discounts and High Unemployment", NBER WP 19871.
[14] Hall, R. E. and P. Milgrom (2008) \The Limited Inuence of Unemployment on the
Wage Bargain", American Economic Review, September, 98(4), 1653-74.
[15] Hornstein, A., P. Krusell and G. L. Violante (2011) \Frictional Wage Dispersion in
Search Models: A Quantitative Assessment", American Economic Review, December,
101(7), 2873-98.
[16] Jolivet, G., F. Postel-Vinay and J.-M. Robin (2006), \The empirical content of the job
search model: Labor mobility and wage distributions in Europe and the US", European
Economic Review, 50(4), 877-907.
[17] Kahn, L. and E. McEntarfer (2014), \Employment Cyclicality and Firm Quality",
NBER Working Paper 20698.
[18] Lemieux, T. (2006) \Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Eects, Noisy
Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?", American Economic Review, June, 96(3),461-498.
[19] Menzio, G. and S. Shi (2011) \Ecient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle",
Journal of Political Economy, 199(3), 468-510.
[20] Mortensen, D. T. (2003)Wage Dispersion: Why Are Similar Workers Paid Dierently?,
MIT Press.
[21] Mortensen, D. T. and C. A. Pissarides (1994) \Job Creation and Job Destruction in
the Theory of Unemployment",Review of Economic Studies, 61, 397-415.
[22] Moscarini, G. and F. Postel-Vinay (2009) \The Timing of Labor Market Expansions:
New Facts and a New Hypothesis", in D. Acemoglu, K. Rogo and M. Woodford, eds.,
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 23, 1-51. [MPV09]
[23] Moscarini, G. and F. Postel-Vinay (2012) \The Contribution of Large and Small Em-
ployers to Job Creation in Times of High and Low Unemployment", American Economic
Review, October, 102(6), 2509-2539. [MPV12]
[24] Moscarini, G. and F. Postel-Vinay (2013) \Stochastic Search Equilibrium", Review of
Economic Studies, 80(4), 1545-1581 [MPV13].
31
[25] Moscarini, G. and F. Postel-Vinay (2014) \Did the Job Ladder Fail After the Great
Recession?", CfM discussion paper No.1 [MPV14].
[26] Petrongolo, B, and C. A. Pissarides (2001) \Looking Into the Black Box: A Survey of
the Matching Function", Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 390-431.
[27] Pissarides, C. A. (1985) \Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment, Vacancies,
and Real Wages", American Economic Review, September, 75(4), 676-690.
[28] Pissarides, C. A (2009) \The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the
Answer?", Econometrica, 77(5), 1339-1369.
[29] Postel-Vinay, F. and J.-M. Robin (2002) \Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker
and Employer Heterogeneity", Econometrica, 70(6), 2295-350.
[30] Robin, J.-M. (2011) \On the Dynamics of Unemployment and Wage Distributions",
Econometrica, 79(5), 1327-1355.
[31] Shimer, R. (2005) \The Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment and Vacancies", American
Economic Review, March, 95(1), 25-49.
[32] Shimer, R. (2012) \Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment", Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics, 15(2), 127-148.
[33] Spear, S. and S. Srivastava, (1987) \On Repeated Moral Hazard With Discounting",
Review of Economic Studies, 54, 599-617.
[34] Storesletten, K., C. Telmer and A.Yaron (2004), "Cyclical dynamics in idiosyncratic
labor market risk", Journal of Political Economy, 112(3), 695-717.
32
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
This proof is adapted from the proof of Proposition 2 presented in Appendix A of MPV13,
and follows the same general strategy. For clarity, we amend the notation slightly in this
proof by restoring the explicit dependence of various variables on the aggregate state of the
economy (!;N), rather than subsuming it into a time index as we do in the main text.
We begin with the following preliminary remark. The rms' maximization problem (10)
is couched in terms of a joint choice of posted worker valuesW and hires h. This joint choice
yields a next-period, state-contingent size:
L (L;W; h; !0; N) := L

1  !0

1  s!0F (W j !0; N)

+ h;
so that the hire ow h = L L  1  !0  1  s!0F (W j !0; N). Problem (10) can therefore
be recast as an equivalent choice of posted value W and future size L . We shall work with
this alternate formulation of the problem in this proof.
We now introduce some more notation. First, we dene the retention rate of a rm
posting value W in state !:
R(W j !;N) :=

1  !0

1  s!0F (W j !0; N)

:
For any choice of (W;L ), the rm makes corresponding hires h = L  R(W )L. We further
let:
' (p; L; !;N) := !pL+ 
Z


!
0
U (!0;N (!0; N))LQ (d!0 j !) ;
with:
N (!0; N) :=
Z p
p
L (x; L (x) ; !0; N) d  (x) :
and:
 (L;W (!0) ;L (!0); !0; N) :=  c [L (!0)  LR (W (!0) j!0)]
+ L
Z +1
W (!0)
vdR (v j !0; N) W (!0) [L (!0)  LR (W (!0) j!0)] :
Fix N to be some given c.d.f. over

p; p

. Then, for any function S (p; L; !), we dene the
following operator MN:
MNS (p; L; !) := ' (p; L; !;N) + 
Z


max
W (!0);L (!0)
D
S [p;L (!0) ; !0]
+  (L;W (!0) ;L (!0); !0; N)
E
Q (d!0 j !) : (23)
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Importantly, as stated in the proposition, we make the following two assumptions: rst,
the sampling c.d.f. F (W ) is everywhere dierentiable. This implies dierentiability of R(W ).
Second, the hiring cost function is such that "(c0) := hc00(h)=c0(h)  1 for all h  0.
We then start the proof with the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Let S (p; L; !) be bounded, continuous in p and L, increasing and convex in L,
and with increasing dierences in (p; L) over
 
p; p
 (0; 1). Then:
1. MNS is bounded and continuous in p and L;
2. There exists a measurable selection (V (p; L; !;N) ;L (p; L; !;N)) from the maximiz-
ing correspondence associated with MNS ;
3. Any such measurable selection is such that V and L are both increasing in p and L;
4. MNS is increasing and convex in L, and has increasing dierences in (p; L) over 
p; p
 (0; 1).
Proof. In this proof, wherever possible without causing confusion, we will make
the dependence of all functions on aggregate state variables ! and N implicit to
streamline the notation.
Points 1 and 2 of this proposition follow immediately from the same arguments
as in the proof of Lemma 1 in MPV13, Appendix A. We now turn to the proof
of point 3. In each future state !0, the rm solves:
max
W;L
hS (p;L ) +  (L;W;L )i ; (24)
where the dependence on !0 and N of the various functions involved was kept
implicit to lighten notation. The FOC for W is:
0 = c0 [L   LR(W )] LR0(W )  [L   LR(W )] (25)
and that for L is:
SL;r(p;L ) W c0 [L   LR(W )]  0  SL;`(p;L ) W c0 [L   LR(W )] (26)
where SL;r and SL;` denote the right- and left-derivatives of S w.r.t. L, which
exist everywhere by convexity of S .
Equation (26) implies that, at an optimal choice ofL ,SL;r(p;L )  SL;`(p;L ).
But convexity of S implies that the converse inequality also holds, which proves
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that S is dierentiable w.r.t. L at any optimal choice of (W;L ). The FOC for
L thus simply writes as:
0 = SL(p;L ) W   c0 [L   LR(W )] :
Next, from the properties of S assumed in the statement of the lemma and
from the convexity of c(), the maximand has increasing dierences in (L ; p)
and (L ; L), and \at" dierences in (W; p) as it is additively separable in (W; p).
Moreover, it has increasing dierences in (L ;W ) if:
c00 [L   LR(W )] LR0(W )  1  0
which, substituting the FOC for W (25), holds around a selection from the opti-
mal correspondence if:
[L   LR(W )] c00 [L   LR(W )]
c0 [L   LR(W )]  1;
which is true by the assumption "(c0)  1.
Let p2 > p1, and denote corresponding selections from the optimal correspon-
dence by (W1;L1) and (W2;L2). Then, by revealed preferences:
[S (p2;L2) +  (L;W2;L2)]  [S (p2;L1) +  (L;W1;L1)]  0
 [S (p1;L2) +  (L;W2;L2)]  [S (p1;L1) +  (L;W1;L1)]
, S (p2;L2) S (p1;L2)  S (p2;L1) S (p1;L1)
which implies that L2  L1 as S has increasing dierences in (p; L). Similarly,
by revealed preferences:
[S (p2;L2) +  (L;W2;L2)]  [S (p2;L2) +  (L;W1;L2)]  0
 [S (p1;L1) +  (L;W2;L1)]  [S (p1;L1) +  (L;W1;L1)]
,  (L;W2;L2)   (L;W2;L1)   (L;W1;L2)   (L;W1;L1)
which, together with the facts thatL2  L1 and that  has increasing dierences
so long as "(c0)  1, shows W2 > W1.
This establishes that any selection (V (p; L) ;L (p; L)) from the optimal cor-
respondence is such that V and L are both increasing in p. We still need to
show that they are also increasing in L. To this end, x W and consider the
optimal choice of L given W and L (call it L ?(W;L). The corresponding FOC
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writes as:
SL;r (p;L
?(W;L)) W   c0 [L ?(W;L)  LR(W )]
 0  SL;` (p;L ?(W;L)) W   c0 [L ?(W;L)  LR(W )] :
As before, convexity of S combined with the FOC above establishes dierentia-
bility of S at L ?(W;L), implying that the FOC indeed holds with equality:
0 = SL (p;L
?(W;L)) W   c0 [L ?(W;L)  LR(W )] : (27)
Next dene the maximand:
M (W;L) = S (p;L ?(W;L)) +  (L;W;L ?(W;L)) :
This maximand is dierentiable w.r.t. L with:
ML(W;L) = c
0 [L ?(W;L)  LR(W )]R(W ) +WR(W ) +
Z +1
W
vdR(v)
Next consider two posted values W2 > W1. Taking dierences of ML(W;L):
ML(W2; L) ML(W1; L)
= c0 [L ?(W2; L)  LR(W2)]R(W2)  c0 [L ?(W1; L)  LR(W1)]R(W1)
+W2R(W2) W1R(W1) 
Z W2
W1
vdR(v)
= fc0 [L ?(W2; L)  LR(W2)]  c0 [L ?(W1; L)  LR(W1)]gR(W1)
+ c0 [L ?(W2; L)  LR(W2)] [R(W2) R(W1)] +
Z W2
W1
R(v)dv;
where the second equality uses integration by parts. Substituting the FOC (27):
ML(W2; L) ML(W1; L) = fSL [p;L ?(W2; L)] SL [p;L ?(W1; L)]gR(W1)
+ c0 [L ?(W2; L)  LR(W2)] [R(W2) R(W1)] +
Z W2
W1
[R(v) R(W1)] dv:
All terms in the r.h.s. of the above equation are positive: the rst one by con-
vexity of S w.r.t. L, and the other two from the fact that R() is an increasing
function. Now, a solution (V (p; L);L (p; L)) to the initial problem (24) also
solves V = argmaxWM (L;W ) and L = L
?(V; L). Because the maximand in
the latter problem has increasing dierences in (W;L), it must be the case that
V (p; L) is increasing in L. And because @L ?=@L and @L ?=@W are both positive
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(provided that "(c0)  1), it must be the case that L (p; L) = L ? (V (p; L); L) is
also increasing in L.
Now on to point 4. Inspection of (23), in combination with the fact that
S is dierentiable w.r.t. L at any optimal solution, shows that MNS is in
fact dierentiable w.r.t. L (a stronger property than claimed in the lemma).
Furthermore:
@
@L
MNS (p; L; !) = !p+ 
Z


!
0
U (!0)Q (d!0 j !)
+ 
Z


(
c0 [L (p; L; !0)  LR (V (p; L; !0)j!0)]R (V (p; L; !0)j!0)
+
Z +1
V (p;L;!0)
vdR (v j !0) + V (p; L; !0)R (V (p; L; !0)j!0)
)
Q (d!0 j !) (28)
This latter equation readily shows that MNS is increasing in L.
What is left is for us to establish that MNS is convex w.r.t. L and has
increasing dierences in (L; p). To this end, rst note that substitution of the
FOC (26) into (28) yields an alternative expression for @MNS =@L:
@
@L
MNS (p; L; !) = !p+ 
Z


!
0
U (!0)Q (d!0 j !)
+
Z


(
SL (p;L (p; L; !
0))R (V (p; L; !0)j!0)+
Z +1
V (p;L;!0)
vdR (v j !0)
)
Q (d!0 j !)
Now take L2 > L1:
@
@L
MNS (p; L2; !)  @
@L
MNS (p; L1; !)
= 
Z


(
SL (p;L (p; L2; !
0))R (V (p; L2; !0)j!0)
 SL (p;L (p; L1; !0))R (V (p; L1; !0)j!0) 
Z V (p;L2;!0)
V (p;L1;!0)
vdR (v j !0)
)
Q (d!0 j !)
= 
Z


(
[SL (p;L (p; L2; !
0)) SL (p;L (p; L1; !0))]R (V (p; L1; !0)j!0)
+
Z V (p;L2;!0)
V (p;L1;!0)
[SL (p;L (p; L2; !
0))  v] dR (v j !0)
)
Q (d!0 j !)
which is positive, by convexity of S , the fact that both V and L are increasing
in L, and the fact that SL (p;L (p; L2; !0))  V (p; L2; !0). This establishes
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convexity of MNS w.r.t. L. Increasing dierences in (L; p) is follows from
similar steps (only taking dierences in p of @MNS =@L), so we omit the details.

Now consider the set of functions dened over

p; p
  [0; 1]  
 that are continuous in
(p; L) and call it C[p;p][0;1]
. That set is a Banach space when endowed with the sup norm.
As Lemma 1 suggests we will be interested in the properties of a subset C 0
[p;p][0;1]
 
C[p;p][0;1]
 of functions that are increasing and convex in L and have increasing dierences
in (p; L). We next state two ancillary lemmas, which will establish as a corollary (Corollary
1) that C 0
[p;p][0;1]
 is closed in C[p;p][0;1]
 under the sup norm.
Lemma 2 Let X be an interval in R and fn : X ! R, N 2 N such that ffng converges
uniformly to f . Then:
1. if fn is nondecreasing for all n, so is f ;
2. if fn is convex for all n, so is f .
Proof. See the appendix of MPV13. 
Lemma 3 Let X  R2 be a convex set and fn : X ! R, N 2 N be functions with increasing
dierences such that ffng converges uniformly to f . Then f has increasing dierences.
Proof. See the appendix of MPV13. 
Corollary 1 The set C 0
[p;p][0;1]
 of functions dened over

p; p
[0; 1]
 that are increas-
ing and convex in L and have increasing dierences in (p; L) is a closed subset of C[p;p][0;1]

under the sup norm.
The latter corollary establishes that, given a xed N , the functions that are relevant to
Lemma 1 live in a closed subset of a Banach space of functions under the sup norm. The
following lemma shows that the operator considered in Lemma 1 is a contraction under that
same norm.
Lemma 4 The operator MN dened in (23) maps C 0
[p;p][0;1]
 into itself and is a contrac-
tion of modulus  under the sup norm.
Proof. That MN maps C 0
[p;p][0;1]
 into itself ows directly from part of the
proof of Lemma 1. To prove that MN is a contraction, we can easily check using
(23) that MN satises Blackwell's sucient conditions with modulus . 
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We are now in a position to prove the proposition. Given the initially xed N , the
operator MN, which by Lemma 4 is a contraction from C[p;p][0;1]
 into itself, and has
a unique xed point SN in that set (by the Contraction Mapping Theorem). Moreover,
since C 0
[p;p][0;1]
 is a closed subset of C[p;p][0;1]
 (Lemma 2) and since M
N also maps
C 0
[p;p][0;1]
 into itself (Lemma 1), that xed point SN belongs to C
0
[p;p][0;1]
.
Summing up, what we have established thus far is that for any xed N 2 C[p;p], the
operator MN over functions of (p; L; !) has a unique, bounded and continuous xed point
S ?N =M
NS ?N 2 C 0[p;p][0;1]
  C[p;p][0;1]
.
We nally turn to the Bellman operatorM which is relevant to the rm's problem. That
operatorM applies to functions S dened on

p; p
 [0; 1]
C[p;p] and is dened as the
following \extension" of MN:
MS (p; L; !;N) := ' (p; L; !;N) + 
Z


max
W (!0);L (!0)
D
S [p;L (!0) ; !0]
+  (L;W (!0) ;L (!0); !0; N)
E
Q (d!0 j !) :
If an equilibrium exists, then a rm has a best response and a value S which solves S =MS.
For every N 2 C[p;p], by denition of M and MN this implies S = MNS. Since the xed
point of MN is unique, if S = MS exists then for every xed N 2 C[p;p] we have for all
(p; L; !) 2 p; p  [0; 1]  
: S (p; L; !;N) = S ?N (p; L; !). Therefore, if the value function
S and an equilibrium of the contract-posting game exist, then S 2 C 0
[p;p][0;1]
: the typical
rm's value function is continuous in p and L, increasing and convex in L and has increasing
dierences in (p; L). By the same standard omparative statics arguments that we invoked in
the proof of Lemma 1, the maximizing correspondence is increasing in p and L in the strong
set sense, hence all of its measurable selections are weakly increasing in p and L.
B Derivation of steady state wage policy
Let F (w) =
R w a(x)
A
d  (x) and G (w) =
R w
L (x) d  (x) denote the wage oer distribution
and the cross-section (earned) wage distributions, respectively. In steady-state equilibrium
the size of a rm oering a wage w is
L (w) =
d
R w
L (x) d  (x)
dw
=
a (w)
A
d
R w
L (x) d  (x)
d
R w a(x)
A
d  (x)
=
a (w)
A
dG (w)
dF (w)
:
To nd an expression for dG=dF , we write the condition for balanced ows below any wage
w: the inow, which is only from unemployment, equals the outow, to unemployment and
to rms oering more than w:
 [1 N (p)]F (w) =  + s(1  )F (w)N (p)G (w)
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Evaluating at the maximum wage w oered and earned we obtain  [1 N (p)] = N (p), so
we can solve for
G (w) =
F (w)
 + s(1  ) [1  F (w)] :
Taking the Radon-Nykodim derivative
L (w) =
a (w)
A
dG (w)
dF (w)
=
a (w)
A
1 + s
1 + sF (w)
2
where  = (1   )= denotes is an inverse measure of frictions, the ratio between the
probabilities with which an unemployed worker receives job oers and an employed worker is
thrown o the ladder back to unemployment. Finally, the hiring inow isH (a; w) = aP (w),
where the chance that an oer is accepted equals
P (w) =
1 N (p) + s (1  )N (p)G (w)
Z
:
The rm maximizes steady-state ow prots, which equal ow output minus wage per
worker, times rm size, minus search costs. Denoting the optimal level of prot achieved by
a type-p rm as (p):
 (p) = max
a0
wmaxh;wmini
L (w) (!p  w)  c (aP (w)) :
Denoting the solution by w (p) ; a (p) = a (w (p)), the Envelope theorem ensures:
0 (p) = !L (w (p)) =
a (p)
A
!(1 + s)h
1 + s
R p
p
a(x)
A
d  (x)
i2
Integrating from p (!) to p:
 (p) = 
 
p (!)

+ (1 + s)!
Z p
p(!)
a(x)
Ah
1 + s
R p
x
a(y)
A
d  (y)
i2dx
Equating this expression to the r.h.s. of (18) we can solve for the wage function (19), where
 = 
 
p (!) ; a
 
p (!)

; p (!)

I

!p > ;wmin
	
(29)
are the prots of the marginal rm in the market, which are zero unless neither the reservation
wage  nor the statutory minimum wage are binding.
To close the model, we nd the reservation wage , thus the lowest productivity rm
active in the market p (!) = max


p; 
!
; wmin
!

. To ease notation, here we omit ! as an
argument of the endogenous variables. The value of unemployment solves
U = b+ 

U + 
Z w

[W (x)  U ] dF (x)

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and the value to the worker of earning a wage w is
W (w) = w + 

U + (1  )W (w) + (1  ) s
Z w
w
[W (x) W (w)] dF (x)

so that W 0 (w) = 1=

1   (1  )  1  sF (w). Substituting those value functions into
the denition of the reservation wage, W () = U , and using integration by parts, one
obtains:
 = b+  [1  (1  ) s]
Z w

[W (x)  U ] dF (x) = b+  [1  (1  ) s]
Z w

W 0 (x)F (x) dx
= b+  [1  (1  ) s]
Z w

F (x)
1   (1  )  1  sF (x)dx
= b+  [1  (1  ) s]
Z w

R p
x
a(y)
A
d  (y)
1   (1  )

1  s R p
x
a(y)
A
d  (y)
dx:
C The computation algorithm
We now describe the algorithm we implement to simulate the dynamic equilibrium of our
model. We simulate the model over an observation window t = 0; 1;    ; T of chosen length
T and a K-point grid of rm productivity values P = fp1;    ; pKg approximating the
continuous support of the distribution  0 (the grid is such that p = p1 < p2 <    < pK = p).
We initiate the simulation by drawing a random path of the aggregate state f!?t gTt=0, which
also determines the path of the job destruction rate, t = (!
?
t ), and an initial condition for
the distribution of employment across productivity types, L?0(pk).
Simulating the model involves solving for the paths of the following endogenous variables,
for all grid points pk 2 P: L?t (pk), ?t (pk), V ?t (pk), a?t (pk), and w?t (pk).21 We use a star
to denote \observed" quantities, i.e. quantities that are realized in the aggregate states
f!?t gTt=0 that our simulated economy does visit. Those have to be distinguished from \latent"
quantities, denoted by t(pkj!), Vt(pkj!), etc., which would be observed at date t if the
economy's aggregate state at date t were ! instead of !?t . The relationship between observed
and latent quantities for any variable X is X?t (pk) = Xt(pkj!?t ).
Simulation proceeds by iteration over successive guesses about the path of rm search
eort, at(pkj!). The typical iteration n takes an initial guess a(n)t (pkj!) as input, and goes
as follows:
21Aggregate variables, such as N?(), A?t , F ?t (pk), Z?t , etc. are then constructed from those rm-level series
by integration over the grid P.
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1. Simulating the employment distribution. Based on the initial guess a
(n)
t (pkj!), we
construct the aggregate rm and oer sampling distributions as per the model's equations:
A
(n)
t (!) =
Z p
p
a
(n)
t (xj!)d (x) and F (n)t (!) =
1
A
(n)
t (!)
Z p
p
a
(n)
t (xj!)d (x)
We then iterate forward in time, starting at date t = 0 from our chosen initial condition
L?0(), to construct the aggregate worker search eort the that applies between periods t and
t+ 1, conditional on any given state !:
Z
(n)
t+1(!) = 1 N?(n)t (p) + s (1  (!))N?(n)t (p);
the job nding and vacancy lling rates that apply between periods t and t+ 1:

(n)
t+1(!) =
m

Z
(n)
t+1(!); A
(n)
t+1(!)

Z
(n)
t+1(!)
and 
(n)
t+1(!) = 
(n)
t+1(!)
Z
(n)
t+1(!)
A
(n)
t+1(!)
;
the advert yield using equation (13):
Y
(n)
t+1 (pkj!) =
1 N?(n)t (p) + s (1  (!))N?(n)t (pk)
Z
(n)
t+1(!)
and the date-t + 1 observed employment distribution using the law of motion of rm-level
employment:
L?
(n)
t+1(pk) = L
?(n)
t (pk)
 
1  (!?t+1)
 h
1  s(n)t+1(!?t+1)

1  F (n)t+1(pkj!?t+1)
i
+ a
(n)
t+1(pkj!?t+1)(n)t+1(!)Y (n)t+1
 
pkj!?t+1

:
2. Simulating job values. After completion of stage 1, we simulate job values by back-
ward recursion over time, starting from the nal date T . More precisely, we construct the
following objects: 
(n)
t (pkj!) U (n)t (!) and V (n)t (pkj!) U (n)t (!) given the terminal condition

(n)
T (pkj!)  U (n)T (!) = !pk   b(!). While obviously inaccurate, this terminal condition has
a vanishing impact on the simulated solution at earlier dates, because of discounting, as
T ! +1. We thus choose a distant nal date T and discard the last T   T ? periods of the
simulation (which are aected by the approximate terminal condition), thus ending up with
a \valid" observation window of length T ?.
The recursion then proceeds as follows. Starting from t = T   1, we rst solve the FOC
(16) for worker values:
V
(n)
t+1(pkj!)  U (n)t+1(!) =
1
Y
(n)
t+1(pkj!)
Z pk
p
h

(n)
t+1(xj!)  U (n)t+1(!)
i
dY
(n)
t+1(xj!):
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We then construct 
(n)
t (pkj!) U (n)t (!) combining the Euler equation (14) and the Bellman
equation dening the value of unemployment, (5):

(n)
t (pkj!)  U (n)t (!) = !p  b(!)
+ E!0j!
(
(1  (!0))
h
1  s(n)t+1(!0)

1  F (n)t+1(pkj!0)
i

(n)
t+1(pkj!)  U (n)t+1(!)

+ (1  (!0)) s(n)t+1(!0)
Z p
p
h
V
(n)
t+1(xj!0)  U (n)t+1(!0)
i
dF
(n)
t+1(xj!0)
  (n)t+1(!0)
Z p
p
h
V
(n)
t+1(xj!0)  U (n)t+1(!0)
i
dF
(n)
t+1(xj!0)
)
3. Updating job adverts. The nal step of the nth iteration is to update the distribution
of posted job adverts. This is done using the FOC (15)
a
(updated)
t (pkj!) = c0 1


(n)
t (pkj!)  V (n)t (pkj!)

 1

(n)
t (!)Y
(n)
t (pkj!)
If the distance between a
(updated)
t (pkj!) and a(n)t (pkj!) is less than a convergence tolerance,
we stop iterating and use the current state of the model as our simulation output. If not,
we continue iterating using a
(n+1)
t (pkj!) = a(updated)t (pkj!) as initial guess.22
Some additional remarks about this simulation protocol are in order. First, the iterative
procedure outlined above only produces a subset of the endogenous variables of interest |
the subset of variables that are needed to update the job advert prole until convergence.
The missing variables (chiey, wages and the value of unemployment) are constructed only
once in a nal run of the loop described above, after convergence of the job advert prole.
Second, for clarity of exposition, we described the simulation protocol in the \simple"
case where there is no binding minimum wage. Our computer code can handle this extra
feature, however. The code is available from:
https://sites.google.com/site/fabienpostelvinay/working-papers
and details of the extra steps that must be taken in the simulation are available upon request.
Finally, execution time obviously depends on the neness of the productivity gridP, the
size of the aggregate state space 
, and the length of the simulation window T . For the values
we use (a 100-point grid for P, 20 dierent states for !, and T = 720 months), execution
time ranges from a few seconds when the simulation is started with an initial guess a
(0)
t (pkj!)
which is \close" to the solution to a few minutes when starting from a coarse approximation.
22In practice, we actually update the guess as a
(n+1)
t (pkj!) = r  a(updated)t (pkj!) + (1   r)  a(n)t (pkj!),
where r 2 (0; 1) is a \relaxation parameter". This helps the algorithm to converge faster and monotonically.
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